Principal Doctrine 32

From Epicurus Wiki

<<Prev | Principal Doctrines | Next>>

[edit] Translation

For all living creatures incapable of making agreements not to harm one another, nothing is ever just or unjust; and so it is likewise for all tribes of men which have been unable or unwilling to make such agreements.

[edit] Analysis

Having established the basis of his understanding of justice in Principal Doctrine 31, Epicurus proceeds to delimit what he means by the "justice of nature". Excluded from it are:

• such animals as are unable to enter into similar agreements about neither harming, nor being harmed by each other.

[There is a logical, or rather biological weakness in this argument: highly social animals (e.g. ants) exhibit characteristically collaborative behavior; it would, however, be absurd to imagine them consciously "entering into agreement" about it.]

• such nations (of humans) as are unable -- strikingly, Epicurus states "or unwilling" (!) -- to enter into such agreements.

In both these cases, pronounces Epicurus, it is meaningless to speak of "just" or "unjust".

[Specifically the possible unwillingness of some "nations" to enter into agreements of neither harming nor being harmed is logically, legally, and philosophically problematic: if they refused to agree, they must at least have been aware of consent as an available option, but instead consciously chose not to agree; that obviously makes the co-existence of such "nations" with other (similarly human, i.e. same-species) groups problematic; and, if one allows for an "opt-out clause" in this "justice of nature", exactly how natural, or how meaningful at all is this sort of justice?]